Truth Conditions for Indicative Conditionals . Robert Stalnaker’s () account is of this type: consider a possible situation in which you touch. Yet if it is a valid inference, then the indicative conditional conclusion must be logically For a fuller discussion and defense of this concept, see Stalnaker. The problem is that if one accepts the validity of the intuitively reasonable direct argument from the material conditional to the ordinary indicative conditional.

Author: Brakora Mehn
Country: South Africa
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Personal Growth
Published (Last): 14 December 2014
Pages: 89
PDF File Size: 15.76 Mb
ePub File Size: 16.51 Mb
ISBN: 846-4-39076-137-6
Downloads: 16347
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Tygonris

Before Reagan’s first election, Reagan was hot favourite, a second Republican, Anderson, was a stalnaked outsider, and Carter was lagging well behind Reagan.

According to the non-truth-functionalist, it depends on whether the wire is live or dead, on whether you are insulated, and so forth. Evans, Jonathan and Over, David, Call this the certainty-preservation principle CPP. On Stalnaker’s account, I indicatiev you.

Adams gave this example But if we use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required. Conditional commands can, likewise, be construed as having the force of a command of the consequent, conditional upon the antecedent’s being true.

Indicative Conditionals

Indicative Conditionals, Misc in Philosophy of Language. A common complaint against Supp’s theory is that if conditionals do not express propositions with truth conditions, we have no account of the behaviour of compound sentences with conditionals as parts see e. Bare conditionals have unpronounced modal operators [my emphasis]. Please, subscribe or login to access full text content. History of Western Philosophy. Classical, Early, and Medieval Prose and Writers: The capacity of the tank is just enough to do miles: The notion of conditional probability entered probability theory at an stalnaler stage because it was needed to compute the probability of a conjunction.


We can, perhaps, ignore as unimportant the use of indicative conditionals in circumstances in which we are certain that the antecedent is false. It is a strikingly simple theory: It stalnakfr that when stalnakwr turn to the theory of uncertain judgements, we find a concept of conditionality in use. First let us delimit our field. Imagine a partition as carved into a large finite number of equally-probable chunks, such that the propositions with which we are concerned are true in an exact number of them.

It does not seem that the content stalnaer our conditional thought has changed. Look at column v. Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. And arguably, the gain in simplicity and clarity more than offsets the oddities.

The direct way is to imagine that we know for sure that the premise is true, and to consider what we would then think about the conclusion. Stalnaker Contributor Webpage Publisher: I reject that conditional. His lesson was stalnakef and important. I believe so, but she might not. Don’t have an account?

Publications Pages Publications Pages. Moritz Schulz – – Philosophical Studies 3: You look sceptical but stay outside, when there is large crash as the roof collapses. And it has many defenders. But the most fruitful development of the idea cinditionals my view takes seriously the last indicaative of the above quote from Ramsey, and emphasises the fact that conditionals can be accepted with different degrees of closeness to certainty.

But it is implausible that the difficulties with the truth-functional conditional can be explained away in terms of what is an inappropriate conversational remark. Among conditional questions we can distinguish those in which the addressee is presumed to know whether the antecedent is true, and satlnaker in which he is not.


And with negations of conditionals and conditionals in antecedents, we saw, the problem is reversed: For indicative conditionals, antecedents are typically live possibilities, and we focus on that case.

According to Gillies, a context determines a set of possibilities compatible with the relevant information in the context.

It is the set of ordered pairs such that if w i is actual and w j is the nearest A -world, the conditional is true. Jackson defends the traditional view. Again the problem becomes vivid when we consider the case when I’m only nearly sure, but not quite sure, that B. Conxitionals I think it is very likely to rain tomorrow, I think it’s very indiactive to be true that it will rain or snow tomorrow.

This has some minor advantages. Which of our theories extends to these other kinds of conditional? By analogy with Lewis, she argues that these are not to be construed as attaching a modal term to a conditional proposition; rather, they are to be construed as attaching a modal term to the main clause, the scope of the modal term being restricted by the conditional clause.

The context set is the set of worlds compatible with what I take for granted, i.

Indicative Conditionals – Oxford Scholarship

Let A and B be two logically independent propositions. Typically, it does not strike students as obviously correct. Intuitively this seems reasonable.

However, it doesn’t rain. We need now to consider the nearest world to w in which Reagan does not win.