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The present article is divided into four parts. I phrase it in this way so as to avoid specifying each of these terms, which I will attempt to clarify throughout the second and third parts.
First, I will discuss otherness as experienceexperience of the other, but non-perceptive, pre-intentional experienceprior even to the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness.
Then, by inverting the order of the terms, I will address experience as othernessi. In the last section I will explore different ways to maintain the following paradox – surface has no depth: Let us begin by asking: Bearing this question levinaas mind, I propose three meanings of exteriority, and three ways of distinguishing them from interiority.
First, there is an exterior that contrasts with the interior in the sense that the physical, externaland publicly accessible domain is different from the psychical domain, the latter being only innerly accessible.
To illustrate this first meaning, the bottle of water which is now before me and also available to iinfinito attention is said to be exterior to me and you, whereas the memories we will keep of it when we leave the room are said to be interior for each one of us.
Besides this natural exteriority, there is an exterior that contrasts with the interior in the sense that I am able to distinguish that which transcends me, that which I am not, from that which does not transcend me or is immanent to me. For example, in this second sense, the memory of this same bottle of water is also said to be exterior, while the present experience which makes me consciousness of that memory or even of the thing itself is termed immanent.
In knfinito second meaning, levins despite considerable oscillation in its debate which falls beyond the scope of this paperthe r may correspond to that which in the field of philosophy of mind is commonly called qualiain contrast with external perceptai. An additional way of understanding this second meaning of exteriority is offered by Sartre, who states that the Ego itself is no less transcendent than any objectivities that consciousness accesses.
Third, there is an exterior which contrasts with the interior in an entirely different sense from those I have just mentioned, and stands even in opposition to them. In the first meaning, the psychical was defined as interiority in relation infinnito the rest of the world. In the second meaning, interiority receded either to a primal sphere of belonging to a transcendental ego or to a nonegoic consciousness, a Sartrean Soi transparent to itself.
Either way, a part of interiority as understood in the first meaning shifts towards exteriority as understood in the second meaning. The third meaning of exteriority does not imply receding further back to an even more primal interiority. Instead, there is a shift towards a radical exteriority, precisely that to which corresponds to the third meaning. In other words, the third meaning is about finding exteriority at the very core of subjectivity. It is the meaning that pushes further the boundary with an interior, precisely because after it there is no further interior, there is no further land of comfort.
As will be seen below, that exteriority is also what is further inside, so to speak, in place of that dispossessed interiority. Finally, and surprisingly, that exteriority is right here, before my eyes, around my ears; it is the whole of experience we are exposed to. Otherness is not a concept; it is even a non-concept, since any effort to circumscribe such a concept of it would be to cancel otherness.
Hence the title proposed for this essay: However, an unfair criticism of Sartre should be noted: More accurately, Sartre means that freedom presupposes responsibility and that the burden of responsibility weighs etiva as a condemnation – particularly because if we were not free we could notand therefore would not have to bear the weight of responsibility. A fairer criticism might be that Sartre failed to acknowledge that the responsibility implied by freedom only makes sense in relation to the other.
In other words, Sartre dissociated freedom from otherness. But the problem of otherness, of the genuine experience of the other, is initially formulated in the 5th of the Cartesian Meditationsa landmark of phenomenology. It follows that understanding the experience of that world implies an understanding of a presupposed experience of the other. In fact, this Cartesian Meditation is entirely devoted to such difficulties. From a phenomenological-transcendental point of view, it is a matter of knowing how it is possible, if indeed it is possible, to come to find the experience of an other in an elucidation of my own Ego.
Finally, it establishes that the appresentation of the other occurs by couplingthat is, by a configuration of pairs based on associationone of the primitive forms of passive synthesis. However, we may ask, under which conditions is such a coupling association possible? The experience of the alter ego is therefore nothing but the experience of the projection of my own self as other. As such, the experience of the other does not take place, and the genuine experience of subjectivity remains limited to that of the subject.
The other does not present itself in the flesh. That way, the self only has access to its own living body. All this makes clear that Husserl did not claim this analogical appresentation of the other to be a genuine experience of the other. It may be argued that if it does take place it is merely as experience of a non-experienceexperience of a frustrated expectation of experience. As regards the coupling by resemblance which makes us constitute an alter ego, a second line of reasoning reveals a difficulty.
A perception of the other, like any other perception, would imply the idea of a same, which would allow recognition of the perceived as such, or, in the case of otherness, recognition of the other by that which is like me in them. As such, otherness and experience reveal themselves to be close concepts: But, actually, this return to a non-intentional consciousness is not enough, and neither does it solve the problem of the existence of the other. Returning to qualitative feeling, or to auto-affective inner life, rich in metaphorical meaning, is in fact to remain in the realm of recognition and of apperception, thus in the sphere of the theoretical and of its logic of sameness.
Maybe, then, we can speak of pre-intentionality without an intentional object, but which is still constitutive. At stake, fundamentally, is consciousness itself.
Indeed, beyond objectivity and subjectivity, we find an experience which is prior to intentionality and even to consciousness. In other words, we find experience as radical, sensitive exposure, or susceptibility, vulnerability. This brings us to the third meaning of exteriority which I outlined at the beginning of this analysis.
In Totality and Infinityit is not an Ego, already consciousness and intentionality, that finds the other levvinas an alter ego.
And so levinzs other can only be found as sensibility – never as consciousness or intentionality. One may ask why sensibility and consciousness stand in opposition here. Hence the Levinasian retreat to an absolutely ante-originel exterior which rescues sensible subjectivity from theoretical repression. But also, doubtless, repressed. Is there such a thing as experience without consciousness or intentionality? This he achieves in the study of certain levina pathologies, in cases where the inexistence of conscious life is evident, yet mental experiences unmistakably continue.
There is another reason for such an affinity. Far from lebinas the physical expression of inner feelings, as if the latter preceded the former such is how the relation between emotions and feelings is most intuitively construedemotions are in fact what feelings expressprecisely while consciousness of emotions. In short, the expressive source lies in r exteriority of which interiority is consciousness, and not the other way around. Not what literature, culture, and philosophy have believed and avowed: Or maybe they are closer levinaz the waste land I alluded to before.
But let us not get ahead of ourselves. Emotions are organic, but this only means that mentality, too, is organic. The depth of the surface. Both the damasian revolution regarding the relation between emotions and feelings and the skin-deep levinasiansensibility point to the depth of the surface.
As such, there appears to be a paradox. The paradox is only apparent: Different modes of this signifying surface may be considered. For instance, consider the face, a central trope in levinasian thought.
The naked face uncovers me and infinto me as sensibility, vulnerability, exposure. We experience the face as passivity, yet cannot contain it in a representation.
The experience of the other in their otherness is engaging, and so it also develops into an experience of singularity. Moreover, there is only visible nakedness, only, one might say, sensible sensibility.
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There is nothing in a face but the etcia of its skin, the wrinkles that outline a gaze or a smile, the shape of forehead frowning. And also a body, its way of walking, and its arms and legs. Gesturing behind the glass, the man in the phone booth who makes Camus wonder in The Elvinas of Sisyphus why he should exist, is nothing other than the depth of his excessive surface. The absurd occurs there only because depth, meaning, is expected from elsewhere than the surface.
This prior saying is not intentional, since there is no attribution of meanings here.
Lévinas, Husserl e Damásio: da outridade como experiência à experiência como outridade
There is no Said without Saying; there is no Said which comprises Saying; and yet Saying is, regardless of the Said and of the non-said. Sincerity, for example, is not when the truth is told, but when exposure happens: But since the Said is also Surface, it can also be Saying. Words are not necessarily predetermined to the relative which excludes the relational, to the theoretical, to the ontological, or to the Same.
I have selected two poem titles whose translation into English fortunately still fits the purpose of my example – Sublimation: If metonymy operates at phrase level, as Jakobson once claimed, then what the poet does here is to metonymize the former lnfinito of the two titles.
And this obviously is not the meaning of the Said, but the Sayingof the signifiers. Sublimation extended into sublime action and divisibility extended into infinigo visibility are revolutions of the matter of words, of physical bodies exposed to signification, to non-indifference. Lveinas these inverted metonymies, over this Said, is metaphorized the movement of their making, and so it becomes at once Said and Saying, starting point and finishing point.
Indeed, the titles become the etia of Saying itself, of the Dire. The Feeling of What Hapens: Body and Emotion in the making of Consciousness.
ETICA E INFINITO (BALSA MEDUSA): EMMANUEL LEVINAS: : Books
Kluwer Academic, p. Kluwer Academic,p. In these notes we find a deep consideration on the experience of the metaphorical meaning, infknito such a way that Levinas even says that God would be the metaphor of all metaphors.
All the contents of this journal, except erica otherwise noted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License. Exteriority without interiority Let us begin by asking: Experience as Otherness Is there such a thing as experience without consciousness or intentionality? Como citar este artigo.